Overview of the Patriots Draft Philosophies & Strategy

Balancing Value, the Present v. the Future, & Trading Picks

One of the most telling stats regarding the Patriots draft philosophy is that since 2000, the Patriots have made 14 trades that have acquired selections in a future draft, but have never sacrificed a pick in a future draft for a pick in a present one. This is likely a reflection of Bill Belichick’s job security and the Patriots organizational goal of building  a team that focuses not just on winning in the current season, but that can consistently competes for a championship every single year.  Because of Belichick’s success and the long-term view taken by owner Robert Kraft and the rest of the organization on down, the Patriots have the luxury on draft-day of being able to leverage the “win-now” mentality of many other teams into more fruitioius draft picks down the road. Oftentimes, the going rate for to acquire a pick in a current draft for a pick in next year’s draft is a pick that is one round higher, i.e. a 2009 third pick is the equivalent of a 2010 second-pick (Future first round picks are an exception and in most cases cost more to acquire). The Patriots are more than willing, especially when they do not have a strong conviction on a player at their current draft slot, to trade a pick for a future selection in a higher round that could ultimately land them a higher quality player down the road.

Recently, fans and local media in New England have begun to criticize the Patriots for their propensity for trading down and for future picks. They argue that the Patriots are too “obsessed” with value* and acquiring picks for the future and as a result have passed on quality players in recent drafts. Some point to the Patriots’ lackuster pass-rush over the last two seasons and the 2009 Draft, in which the Patriots traded down twice from their 1^st round pick at 23^rd overall, passing on OLB Clay Matthews (who had 10 sacks as a rookie with Green Bay, who took him with the 26^th overall pick), and failure to draft a pass-rushing OLB at all as an example of this strategy hurting the team. I believe this criticism is misguided. If you want to criticize the Patriots for not drafting Clay Matthews or other players they have passed on over the years, focus on their evaluation of the player rather than the Patriots adherence to finding value with each pick. In my opinion, the Patriots strategy of trading out of pick when they do not see adequate value on the board is a sound one, as it leads to more selections that yield more players and greater draft and financial flexibility. It also prevents picking a player who the team isn’t that high on but takes simply because of a need on the roster and/or fan pressure- a strategy that has often led to failure for other NFL franchises. If they trade out of a selection and pass on an eventual Pro-Bowl level player who likely would have succeeded within the Patriots’ system, it is not because of some misguided desire to trade down simply for fun or to save money. Rather, the mistake was made in their evaluation of the player that determined he was not worth that selection.  In my view, while it may be the Patriots liked Matthews’ intagibles and ability to rush the passer, they believed he lacked the height, length, and lower body strength to “set the edge” in the run game as an OLB in their defensive system and thus he didn’t warrant a first-round grade.

Value also seems to be an important consideration when the Patriots trade up in the draft order. The Patriots will move up in the draft when the player they are trading up to take presents a) good value at the spot and b) a significantly higher value than anyone at their current slot. For example, when the Patriots traded up from #32 to #21 in the 2002 draft to select Daniel Graham, they probably had a signficantly higher grade on him than any other player who would likely be available at #32 and that Graham’s grade indicated a good value at #21.

Balancing Value, Need, & Best Player Available

One of the more common misconceptions about the Patriots (and just about every other NFL team) is that they don’t draft for need. The modern NFL economic landscape creates holes on every NFL roster every year that can’t always be filled by veteran acquisitions, or talented, highly drafted players who have sat and developed for years on the back end of the roster. Thus, these holes are often best filled by young and (mostly) cost-effective draft picks, providing teams select the right players. Thus, when efficient drafting teams such as the Patriots assign a value to the player they must consider how that player is going to impact their roster and the overall success of their team in the present and the near future. Another way to examine this issue is to consider a prospect’s net utility: How much of an upgrade is the prospect over the current player(s) at his position on the Patriots? Will the prospect’s youth, cheaper salary, and projected production make him more valuable than the current player he may be replacing? Are the current players at that position on the roster beginning to decline in production or set for free agency? In determining a prospect’s net utility, clearly the status of the Patriots current roster comes into play. For example, if the Patriots will likely not draft a rookie QB in the first-round in the foreseeable future because that player is highly unlikely to provide much net utility to the Patriots, because the high pick, salary that would accompany him, and production he would likely bring would not compare favorably to the value of Tom Brady. Conversely, an OLB or TE who the Patriots have graded in the first-round range would have a greater net utility to the Patriots if selected in the first-round because of the thinner states of those positions on the current roster. The concept of net utility leads one to think that if the Patriots had multiple players with similar grades, the player with the greater net utility would be higher on their board. That is not to say the Patriots wouldn’t take a player who wasn’t necessarily a need pick, provided they felt he was clearly the best player available.

Another aspect of net utility is general positional value. Positional value can be defined as the impact the level of play at a certain position has on the overall success of the team with their system. For example, a LT has much more positional value than a kicker, as having elite-level production at LT has a much greater effect on the outcome of a game than elite-level production from a kicker. Another component that plays into positional value is the rarity of productive players at that position. Consider a team that has the 8^th best QB in the NFL (and the 30^th best as their backup) and the most productive RB (and the 40^th best as their backup). In all likelihood, the downturn in production from the QB position if the starter was lost would be much greater than the downturn if the RB was lost. Generally speaking, positions such as QB, LT, NT in a 3-4 defense, CB and pass-rushing DE/OLBs have greater positional value than TEs, RBs, and Safeties. Thus, if the Patriots were considering two players with similar grades who would provide a similar level of upgrade in production at their respective positions, the positional value of each prospect could be a determining factor in determining which prospect had a higher level of net utility.

Fitting the System

When the Patriots evaluate prospects, they do not judge simply how a player will fare in the NFL in general but how he will succeed in the Patriots schemes on offense, defense, and special teams. As will be explored later in this report, the Patriots look for certain characteristics in each player that they believe will best help him succeed in the Patriots’ system at their position. The skills that are emphasized and necessary at each position are different on different teams, depending on their schemes. For example, what is required of defensive lineman in the Patriots 3-4 defense is vastly different than what is required of DLs in the Bears Cover 2 scheme. According to “Patriot Reign”- a book by Michael Holley in which the inner workings of Patriots coaching and roster-building between 2002-2004 are explored-Patriots talent evaluators are not faulted if there are high on a player who ultimately fails to succeed with another team, because there is little way of telling whether that player may have flourished in the Patriots’ system with Patriots coaching.

Trading Down and/or for future picks & Flexibility

An additional benefit to acquiring extra picks, both for the present and future, is the ability to use them to move up in the draft order without leaving large “holes” (going more than 50 selections without a pick) in a draft. This has certainly been the case for the Patriots, who have used picks in a current draft to move up in the draft order 12 times since 2000. Without the extra picks acquired from trading down and for future picks, the Patriots may lack the ability to trade up in the draft order if they so choose. .

Player Intangibles and Personality

One thing that is difficult to measure from an outsider’s perspective are the intangible aspects of a prospect, whether it be a prior criminal history, work ethic, leadership skills, attitude, mental toughness, and intellectual aptitude for football. The Patriots place a high priority on the mental makeup of a prospect. They want players who have football intelligence, the mental toughness to take tough coaching, and a work ethic that shows that football is their #1 priority. For this project, a player’s intangibles were taken into account in their evaluation, but they were based only on trusted media reports and my own perception of the player from published or broadcasted interviews. Intangibles are somewhat easier  (albeit still difficult) to evaluate for Patriots coaches and scouts because of their greater access to information. They can talk to a prospects coaches, personally interview and test players, and use their considerable advantage in time, resources, experience, and personal connections to evaluate player intangibles.

While the Patriots place a high priority on stocking their roster with high character leaders, they have drafted prospects with perceived “character risks” in the past. Such players include T.J Turner, Brock Williams, Hakim Akbar, Antoine Womack, Cedric Cobbs, Brandon Meriweather, and Brandon Tate. In all these cases, Belichick has spoken about how the team believed they had done their due diligence and research and determined each player’s issues were overblown, behind them, and/or the Patriots locker room could help them mature. Taking these players also speaks to the Patriots focus on value in the draft, as selecting prospects who would have been higher picks but for their off the field problems could represent substantial value if the player can overcome their past issues.

Feeder Programs

The following college programs are teams in which Bill Belichick and the Patriots have connections with, whether through former Belichick assistants who are now coaches at the school or that Belichick has developed personal relationships with. Players from these schools merit close watching come draft time, as many of them played in offensive and defensive systems similar to those of the Patriots, making them easier to evaluate and potentially shortening their NFL learning curve. In addition, the Patriots can get a more honest and in-depth scouting reports of players because of the relationship with their coaches.

–Florida: Bill Belichick has recently become close with Florida Head Coach Urban Meyer. The two have met in the offseason in the past and Belichick has openly expressed an interest in the way Meyer runs his spread option offense. Belichick has also addressed the Gators at practices and reportedly has given advice to former Gator QB Tim Tebow. Past players drafted from Florida during Meyer’s tenure include WR Chad Jackson and OLB Jeremy Mincey.

–Alabama: Alabama Head Coach Nick Saban worked for Belichick in Cleveland and the two still speak often. Alabama also runs a 3-4 defense hat is similar to the Patriots.

–Texas: Belichick has in the past spoken about his admiration for Will Muschamp, a former Saban assistant and the current defensive coordinator and Head Coach in waiting at Texas. The Patriots drafted CB Jonathan Wilhite out of Auburn in 2008 (where Muschamp coached Wilhite), and late in the 2008 season Belichick said of Wilhite: “He was very well coached down there by Will [Muschamp]. Will recommended him. Will has coached a lot of good football players both in college and at Miami. He knows what NFL corners are and he runs a pro system so the adjustments and the things he did at Auburn were very similar to what we would ask our players to do, in terms of making adjustments, recognizing things and different techniques. And you can see him do them. So it was a good evaluation and I thought from that standpoint he was ahead of most corners that would come out.” Texas also employs some 3-4 packages. From this, it is clear that defensive players from Texas bear watching come draft time.

–Iowa: Iowa Head Coach Kirk Ferentz was an offensive line coach for Belichick in Cleveland and the two remain in touch. The Patriots selected Iowa G/C Mike Elgin in 2007.

–Fresno State: Fresno St. Head Coach Pat Hill coached offensive lineman and tight ends for Belichick in Cleveland during the 1996 season and the two remain in touch. The Patriots drafted Fresno St. G Logan Mankins and S James Sanders in 2005.

–Notre Dame: Former Patriots offensive coordinator Charlie Weis was the head coach at Notre Dame from 2005 to 2009. He ran a similar offense at Notre Dame that the Patriots run today. In addition, recently hired Patriots defensive assistant Corwin Brown was the defensive coordinator at Notre Dame from 2007-2009, and employed a 3-4 defense. Players entering the draft over the next three years from Notre Dame will be familiar with the Patriots schemes and terminology and Brown should be able to supply a more in-depth scouting report of many of the players. The Patriots drafted Notre Dame G/C Dan Stevenson in 2006 and CB Mike Richardson in 2007.

*In this context, the term value is best defined as an alignment of the spot in the draft where the Patriots select a player and the grade assigned to the player. For example, if the Patriots have a prospect graded out as a mid first-round pick, they would prefer to select that player in the middle of the first-round or later. It is also important to note that just because there are 32 picks in the first-round and 256 total selection doesn’t mean the Patriots have 32 players graded as first-round picks or 256 players graded as draftable prospects. There maybe more or less such players depending upon the available talent in a given draft.